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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a theory of market crashes resulting from a delever-
aging shock. We consider two representative investors in a market holding
different opinions about the public available information. The deleveraging
shock forces the high confidence investors to liquidate their risky assets to
pay back their margin loans. When short sales are constrained, the delever-
aging shock creates a liquidity vacuum in which no trades can occur between
the two representative investors until the price drop to a threshold below
which low confidence investors take over the reduced demands. There are
two roles short sellers could play to stabilize the market. First, short sellers
provide extra supply in a bullish market so that the price of the asset is set-
tled lower than otherwise. Second, short sellers catch the falling price earlier
in the deleveraging process if they are previously allowed to hold a larger
short position. We apply our model to explain the recent deleveraging crisis
of the Chinese market with great success.
Keywords: Deleveraging, short sale constraints, market crash, Chinese
stock market
1. Introduction
Debt has become a hot topic since excessive debt is quoted as the key
contributing factor of the economic problems in the Great Depression (Fisher
(1933)), Japan’s lost decade (Koo (2011)), and current financial crisis afflict-
ing both the United States and Europe (see e.g., Mian and Sufi (2012); Hall
(2011); Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011)). It has been argued by Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012); Korinek and Simsek (2014) that a deleveraging shock following the
Email address: liangwu@scu.edu.cn (Liang Wu)
Preprint submitted to http://arxiv.org/ November 5, 2018
excessive debt could push the economy into a situation of so called liquidity
trap in which the creditors can not make up for the reduction consumption
by the debtor unless the interest goes negative. The existence of liquidity
trap is revealed in a simple New-Keynesian model in which two representative
agents, borrowers and lenders who differ in their rates of time preference.
Excessive debt could also be vicious to the financial system as illustrated
by the recent turmoil in the Chinese stock market. How could the excessive
debt and the following deleveraging shock impact the market? Does it create
a liquidity trap in the financial system? To investigate these questions, we
use a similar theoretic framework consisting of two representative investors.
This theoretical framework is recently implemented by Xu (2007) in his study
of the price convexity and skewness when short sales are constrained. The
model assumes that the two representative investors are low precision in-
vestors (denoting as L type) and high precision investors (H type). They
have the same public available information, but they interpret the informa-
tion differently. H investors are more confident in the precision of the market
signal and would buy more aggressively when the market signal is bullish than
L investors. When the market information is bullish, H investors compete
with L investors and even among themselves to push the price very high. H
investors can borrow from the cash market if they are short of capital. In this
framework, we could analyze what would happen if there is a deleveraging
shock to H investors who use margin loans to invest at the previous stage.
The shock can come from exogenous sources, for example, it could come from
the regulator to tight the monetary policy, or to clear the unmonitored lever-
age as recently implemented in China. It can also come from endogenous
reasons, for example, the information of the market swings back from bullish
to less bullish or to bearish. The price of the risky asset comes back down.
When such things happen, the shrinking of H investors’ assets force them to
liquidate their holdings to pay back their debt.
In the real economy, one reason that the demand reduced by the debt
can not be consumed by the creditor is because there is a lower bound of the
interest. The other reason is that the price of the consumption product is
sticky and creditor has to take all the reduced demand at the given price. In
the financial system, the price of the investment product can vary freely in a
short run. The deleveraging process does not create a liquidity trap. When
the price comes back down, L investors can make up for the demand reduced
by H investors at a lower price according to his price demand schedule. The
reduced demand of the investment product by the debtor can be consumed
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completely as long as the price is low enough.
It is a relief that there is no liquidity trap problem in the financial market,
however, the deleveraging process would cause the crash of the market when
investors are under short sale constraints. If there are no short sale con-
straints, there are two roles short seller could play to stabilize the market.
First, when the information is very bullish, as H investors push the price
high, L investors can provide extra supply to H investors by short selling, so
that the price is settled lower than otherwise. Second, since L investors short
sell following the price all the way up, when the market swings back down,
the short sellers immediately start to buy back the asset all the way down
until the deleveraging process finishes. If there are short sale constraints,
L investors are crowded out before H investors push the price further high
among themselves to compete for the demand. When the price comes back
down, L investors would not buy untill the price drops to the level right be-
fore they leave the market. The market could experience a free fall (we call
it liquidity vacuum in contrast with the term liquidity trap) during which H
investors can not liquidate their holdings to L investors to reduce their debt.
It is ironic that short sale constraints become the reason of the market crash,
while the implementation of the short sale constraints is supposed to protect
the market from crash by restricting short selling activity.
The literature on the impacts of short sale constrains is extensive. It has
been revealed by Miller (1977); Jones and Lamont (2002) that short sale con-
straints can prevent negative information from being expressed and therefore
lead to the overpricing of securities. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) study more
than 12,600 stocks from 26 countries and conclude that relaxing short-sales
constraints has improved the price efficiency without an association with an
increase in either price instability or the occurrence of extreme negative re-
turns. Bris et al. (2007); Chang et al. (2007, 2014); Zhao et al. (2014) make
similar empirical observations that market efficiency can be improved when
the short sale constraints are lifted.
A mechanism that short sale constraints could cause the market crash
has been studied by Hong and Stein (2003). In their model, the market
price is set by the rational expectation to reflect the information revealed by
the trading activities of heterogeneous investors who hold different opinions
about the stock’s price. When investors are under short sale constraints, bad
information is not fully reflected in a bullish market. However, when the
market swings back, hidden bad information and thus a larger scale of price
adjustment comes out and potential could cause the crash of the market.
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In this paper, we offer a different mechanism for the market to crash when
short sale constraints are present. The mechanism lies in the deleveraging
shock for debtor to unwinding their loans. The short sale constraints create
a liquidity vacuum in which L investors can not make up for the reduced
demand by H investors untill the price crashes to a low level.
Short sale constraints are still fully imposed in some emerging markets
(Bris et al. (2007)). Bai et al. (2007) list various costs and legal and insti-
tutional restrictions that could impose constraints on short selling. During
the turbulent times, short sales are often partially re-imposed although they
have been fully practiced under norm circumstances. Qiu and Zhang (2013)
argues that short-sale constraints will continue to affect the global financial
markets in the future. It is therefore necessary for investors and especially
policy makers to understand the potential problems including the market
crash risk associated with short sales are constrained.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we solve
the model and analyze the consequence when there is a develeraging shock.
In section 3, we first present numerical examples to show that market crashes
could be caused by a deleveraging shock when short sales are constrained.
Then we apply our model to the case of the most recent crisis in the Chines
stock markets. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
We extend Xu (2007)’s model for the inclusion of a deleveraging shock.
The market consists of two assets, namely, a risky asset with a random
payoff equal to x and a risk-free asset with gross interest rate R. There are
two types of investors who have the same public information, but disagree
with the precision of the information. When the signal s is revealed to the
public at time 1, trading happens between the two types of investors and
the market clears at equilibrium. At time 2, there is a sudden deleveraging
shock. Debtors are required to unwind their loans if they borrow from the
cash market at time 1.
We use the same notations as in Xu (2007). Assume that the public
information is the signal with respect to the payoff of the risky asset at time
1, denoted as s = x+ ǫ. x and ǫ are independent normal distributed random
variables, i.e., x ∼ N (µx, τ−1x ) and ǫ ∼ N (0, τ
−1
ǫ ), where τx and τǫ are the
precision of x and ǫ, respectively. Assume that investors agree over the
distribution of x but disagree over the prevision τǫ. Low confidence investors
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believe that the precision the ǫ is τ 2L, and high confidence investors who
believe that the prevision is τH , τL < τH
1. The proportion of τH investors
is λ.
Investors maximize expected utility of wealth at the end of each period,
whose utility function is assumed to be2,
maxy1,θU(W1,θ) ≡ Eθ[W1,θ|s]−
a
2
Var(W1,θ|s) (1)
s.t. W1,θ = (W0,θ − y1,θP1)R + y1,θx
where W0,θ is the total initial wealth of type θ investor.
After take a derivative over Eq. (1), we have a price and demand rela-
tionship for each type of investors to follow if no constraints are imposed,
y1,θ =
(µˆθ −RP1)τˆθ
a
(2)
where τˆθ ≡ Var
−1
θ (x|s) = τx+τθ is the posterior precision, and µˆθ ≡ Eθ[x|s] =
τx
τˆθ
µx+
τθ
τˆθ
s is the posterior mean of the actual payoff x given the public signal
of s.
2.1. Short sale constraints
Different from Xu(2007)’s modeling, we assume that the short sale con-
strains are not fully imposed. There is a cap on the proportion of the asset
that can be borrowed short sale practice. This modification enables us to ap-
ply the model to analyze the Chinese stock market where the margin lending
and short sale policy has been practiced for more than 5 years. The scale of
the short sale, however, is still very small. The other reason for this modi-
fication is that we can see that the gradual lift of the short sale constraints
can lessen the risk of market crash.
1The precision of investors hold about the signal s can have multiple values and can
even be continuous. If we divide the investors into two groups according to if their precision
is lower or higher than a threshold T , type τH is the representative investor of the high
precision investors above T such that τH =
∫
∞
T
dλτ τ∫
∞
T
dλτ
, and type τL is the representative
investor of the low precision investors below T such that τL =
∫
T
0
dλτ τ∫
T
0
dλτ
.
2The mean-variance utility function is equivalent to the utility function U(Wθ(t)) =
−e−aWθ(t) under the normality assumption of s.
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Assume that the proportion of the assets investors can borrow for short
sales does not exceed N , i.e., λyL ≥ −N, (1 − λ)yH ≥ −N , where N ≥ 0.
The equilibrium solution is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (a) If condition: µˆH − µˆL >
a(1+N)
(1−λ)τˆH
+ aN
λτˆL
(or s > µx +
a(1+N)τˆL
(1−λ)(τH−τL)τx
+ aNτˆH
λ(τH−τL)τx
), the equilibrium is given as P1 = PH , λy1,L =
−N, (1− λ)y1,H = 1 +N ;
(b) If condition: µˆL − µˆH >
a(1+N)
λτˆL
+ aN
(1−λ)τˆH
(or s < µx −
a(1+N)τˆH
λ(τH−τL)τx
−
aNτˆL
(1−λ)(τH−τL)τx
), the equilibrium is given as P1 = PL, λy1,L = 1 + N, (1 −
λ)y1,H = −N ;
(c) If condition (a) and (b) do not hold, the equilibrium is given as,
P1 =
λτˆLµˆL + (1− λ)τˆH µˆH − a
R(λτˆL + (1− λ)τˆH)
(3)
y1,L =
1/a(1− λ)τˆLτˆH(µˆL − µˆH) + τˆL
λτˆL + (1− λ)τˆH
(4)
y1,H =
1/aλτˆLτˆH(µˆH − µˆL) + τˆH
λτˆL + (1− λ)τˆH
(5)
In the above expressions, PH and PL are the price corresponding to the
demand (1−λ)y1,H = 1+N of H investors, and λy1,L = 1+N of L investors,
respectively. They are given by the following expressions:
PH =
1
R
(µˆH −
a(1+N)
(1−λ)τˆH
) (6)
PL =
1
R
(µˆL −
a(1+N)
λτˆL
) (7)
Proof. Under (a), according to the price demand relationship of Eq. (2),
the demand λy1,L of L investors exceeds the short sale constraints. The
short sales of L investors are saturated at the lower bound λy1,L = −N , the
equilibrium price is therefore determined by the demand of the H investors
from the market clearing condition (1−λ)y1,H = 1−λy1,L = 1+N . From the
price demand relationship, we have P1 = PH . Similar reasoning is applied
to (b). In this case, the short sales of H investors are saturated at −N . P1
is determined by λy1,L = 1 + N . Under (c), the equilibrium is solved by
plugging Eq. (2) for both L and H investors to the market clearing condition
λy1,L,0 + (1− λ)y1,H,0 = 1.
6
2.2. Deleveraging shock
Now we consider a scenario when s is very bullish as in condition (a)
of Proposition 1. Only H investors hold the risky asset and would like to
leverage if they are short of capital. If H investors are in debt, they have
to liquidate part or all of the risky asset when facing a deleveraging shock.
Since in this case L investors are crowded out, the price P1 of the risky asset
at time 1 is higher than the price threshold Ps below which L investors are
willing to absorb the demand reduced by the H investors. The threshold
price Ps is determined if we set the demand of L investors to be λy1,L = −N ,
Ps =
1
R
(µˆL +
aN
λτˆL
). (8)
If under condition (a) of Proposition 1,
P1 − Ps = PH − Ps > 0 (9)
The positive difference P1−Ps between P1 and Ps creates a liquidity vacuum.
The price of the risky asset would experience a free fall from P1 to Ps before
the liquidation of H investors can actually start. There is no buying from
L investors to help H investors unwind their debt. Note from Eq. (6) and
Eq. (8), PH is a decreasing function of N and Ps is an increasing function of
N . If the short sale constraints of L investors are less strict (N is larger),
short sales from L investors can reduce the impact of the deleveraging shock
by reducing the difference P1 − Ps from two sources. First, at time 1 they
provide extra liquidity to H investors by short selling when s is very bullish,
so that P1 can not be pushed that high. Second, the short sellers can sell all
the way up to the equilibrium price if they are under less strict constraints.
At time 2 they step in immediately at a high price level to absorb the demand
reduced by H investors when there is a deleveraging shock. On the contrary,
if the short sellers are force to leave the market before the price is pushed
high due to the strong demand of H investors, they could come back only
when the price drops back to the level they leave the market.
In addition to the free fall of the price before L investors come back,
the price needs to adjust further for H investors to sell off enough asset to
pay back their debt. Assume that the leveraging ratio is η, i.e., the debt H
investors owe is ηP1 (P1 is also the market value of the risky asset when there
is only 1 share).
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Let P2 be the price at which the risk asset finally stabilizes,∫ P2
P ∗
Pλdy1,L =
∫ P2
P ∗
P
−λτˆLR
a
dP
=
λτˆLR
2a
(P ∗2 − P 2x ) = ηP1 (10)
P 22 = P
∗2 −
2aηP1
λτˆLR
(11)
where P ∗ = min(P1, Ps) is the highest price L investors start to add their
holdings of the risky asset. It is possible that H investors can not pay back
all debt when η is large enough. In this case, the lowest level P2 drops to is
after H investors dump all of their holdings, and thus P2 is bounded below
by P2 ≥
1
R
(µˆL −
a
λτˆL
) when y2,L = 1.
In the above analysis, we assume that s remains the same during the
deleveraging process. The crash of the market conveys a negative signal. s
could decrease significantly, which drags the price further deeper and crates
an even bigger problem.
Can the lowering of interest stabilize the market? First, the lowering
of interest to support the crash of a financial bubble is not justified if the
financial crisis does not hurt the real economy. Even if it does, there is a
limit the lowering of the interest can increase Ps since the interest rate is
lower bounded by (µˆL +
aN
λτˆL
). If s is large enough, the gap between P1 and
Ps still exists,
3. Results
3.1. Simulation
In this section, we present some numerical examples to illustrate how
the market crashes when there is a deleveraging shock. The parameters in
our examples are set as µx = 1.5, τx = 1, R = 1.05, τL = 0.5, τh = 1.5, λ =
0.5, a = 0.5, s = 5. We set the short sale constraints parameter N in a rather
large region N ∈ [0, 0.6] to cover many different scenarios. In some case
N ∈ [0, 0.5), we have s > µx + A and therefore P1 > Ps. There are some
other cases N ∈ (0.5, 0.6], we have µx − B < s < µx + A, and therefore
P1 < Ps. Suppose at time 1, H investors have enough cash (they can borrow
if not) to clear the market at P = PH when s > µx + A, and at P = P1,0
when µx − B < s < µx + A. The leverage ratio is given as η ∈ [0, 0.4]. The
amount of debt H investors owe at time 1 is equal to ηP1.
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First, we plot P1 and Ps against N in Fig. 1. As expected by the theoretic
model, the figure shows that P1 and Ps are respectively the decreasing func-
tion and increasing function of N in a bullish market. In addition, we also
plot the threshold price Ps0 when we set R = 1 with zero actual/nominal in-
terest rate. It shows that lowering the interest rate gives L investors incentive
to step in at a higher price but can not completely solve the liquidity vacuum
problem. At N = 0.5, P1 and Ps meet and the liquidity vacuum during which
the price would free fall vanishes before H investors are able to unwind the
debt. The final price return log(P2)−log(P1) is reported in Fig. 2 for different
combinations of η and N . The top figure presents the three-dimensional view
of the log-return as the function of η and N . The bottom figure presents the
contour of the log-return in the η−N plane. The maximum reduction of the
price (log return is −0.32) is obtained at (η,N) = (0.4, 0), when leverage is
at the highest level and no short sale is allowed. The minimum reduction of
the price (log return is 0) is obtained at (η,N) = (0, [0.5, 0.6]), when short
sale is allowed to be more than 0.5 share and there is no debt. Notice that
even when there is slight debt and when short sales are not fully practiced
(η = 0+, N < 0.5), the market would experience a non-zero free fall crash.
When N ∈ [0, 0.5), the larger the leverage ratio η is or the smaller the
short sale constraint ratio N is, the deeper the market would crashes into.
When N ∈ (0.5, 0.6], further increase of N does not change the price return,
since in this case P1 < Ps. We have already eliminated liquidity vacuum
problem. The drop of the price is purely caused by the liquidating operation
of H investors.
3.2. Empirical Results
The Chinese market has experienced an unseen rally for almost 10 years
from the late half 2014 to the early half of 2015. The CSI300 index, an
index of Chinas biggest-listed companies, reaches the highest point of 5335
on June 12, 2015 from 2164 on July 1, 2014. It is a massive 147% surge
in less than 1 year. But it soon crashes to 3663 after 17 trading days on
July 8, 2015. The maximum daily loss of CSI300 index is 8.25% recorded
on June 26, 2015 (even when there is a daily 10% limit of price change for
all stocks traded in the Chinese markets). There are 8 days out of 17 days
from June 12, 2015 to July 8, 2015, when more than 900 stocks halt trading
because they hit the 10% daily bottom limit. The stock prices have been
pushed so quickly in less than 1 year. It is firmly in the bubble territory
and should reasonably be followed by a correction. However, the anticipated
9
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Figure 1: P1 and Ps are respectively the decreasing function and increasing function of N
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correction of over-valued stocks hardly seems cause for the dramatic disaster.
The government has taken a spectacle of drastic actions to save the market.
The People’s Bank of China intervenes on June 27, 2015 by cutting the
interest by 0.25%. The initial public offerings are suspended on July 3,
2015 by limiting the supply of shares to drive up the prices of those already
listed. Far from saving the market from drowning, those efforts only pushed
the market further under water. Starting from July 6, the China Securities
Finance Corporation Limited (CSF) starts to buy blue chip stocks and even
small and medium-sized stocks. On July 8, CSF lends 260 billion yuan to 21
brokerage firms so they can purchase ”blue chip” stocks on top of what the
120 billion the brokerages vowed to buy. The market finally stabilizes and
rebounces on July 9, 2015. Fortunately, the financial crisis in China is not a
systemic risk. Less than 15% of household financial assets are invested in the
stock market: which is why soaring shares did little to boost consumption
and crashing prices will do little to hurt it.
One fact can not be ignored to understand the frenetic behavior of the
market. The rally of the Chinese market is boosted by the margin lending.
Many stocks were bought on debt. People borrow money with an interest
rate of about annual 8.6% to invest in the market from the margin lending
channel offered by brokers for a designated list of stocks. From the public
monitored data of margin lending, the outstanding margin loan amounts
more than 2,200 billion yuan, which is about 11% of the market value of those
designated stocks. In addition to the public available data, there are other
sources of margin lending which is not monitored by the China’s Securities
Regulatory Commission. The unmonitored margin lending loan amounts
more than 1,700 billion yuan with a cost of 13%-20% annul rate. It is not
sustainable and the unwinding of these debt causes the rapid crash of the
market which the government has been unable to stop.
In this section, we use the monitored margin lending and short selling
data to test our model. In the Chinese market, a list of designated stocks
are allowed for margin lending and short sale practice. Up to June 12, 2015,
there are 895 of them, among which 846 stocks have outstanding margin
lending loans. We use the outstanding margin lending loans and short sale
data recorded on June 12, 2015 when the CSI300 index hits the highest point.
The price return is calculated from June 12, 2015 to July 8, 2015 when the
market hits the bottom for the first stage. During this period of fast melting
down process, although the People’s bank of China cuts the interest rate and
IPO is suspended. Only until the rather late part of the considered period
12
Table 1: Description statistics of 846 Chinese stocks that have non-zero outstanding margin
loans on June 12, 2015. The time period to measure the log-return is from June 12, 2015
to July 8, 2015. The outstanding margin loans and short sale data used to calculate the
leverage ratio and short sale ratio are recorded on June 12, 2015. The leverage ratio and
short sale ratio are calculated using the published outstanding margin loans and short
interest with respect to the outstanding market value of each considered stock.
Mean Std.
log-return -0.59 0.31
β 0.74 0.15
smb 0.33 0.21
hml 0.029 0.24
leverage ratio 0.11 0.053
short sale ratio 1.90× 10−4 2.51× 10−4
(starting from June 6th, 2015), there is direct massive intervention from CSF
by buying falling not only blue chips but also medium or small-sized stocks.
Th considered melting down period can be viewed as purely dragged by the
market force.
The descriptive statistics of the variables for the considered period is list
in Table. 1. βs of the considered stocks are estimated using data from January
1, 2013 to June 12, 2015. The average log-return of the considered stock is
-0.59 with standard deviation of 0.31. Since the stocks in the designated list
are mostly large-sized, the average beta is only 0.74. The leverage ratio and
short sale ratio are both calculated by dividing the outstanding lending loan
(for leverage ratio) and short interest (for short sale ratio) by the outstanding
market value. The average leverage ratio is at the high level of 0.11. Although
the margin lending and short sale policy has been implemented back from
2010, there are still limited sources for investors to borrow the stocks for
short sales. The short sale ratio is rather small compared to the leverage
ratio. The average short sale ratio is only 1.9× 10−4.
First, we show the log-return data of the considered 846 stocks. The data
is presented in a similar way as the numerical examples. The log-returns of
the stocks from June 12, 2015 to July 8, 2015 are plotted against the leverage
ratio and short sale ratio. The results are depicted in Fig. 3. The dots are
the actual data. The surface of the top figure and the contour in the bottom
are the interpolated results using a local linear regression to fit the samples
(using the ”fit” function from Matlab the fitting method ”lowessfit”). The
results are qualitatively similar to the numerical results. The log-returns
13
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Table 2: Regression analysis of stock returns. The explained variables are the returns
of Chinese stocks from June 12, 2015 to July 8, 2015. The three columns report the
regression results when the dependent variables are: the FAMA three factors; the leverage
ratio and short sale ratio; the FAMA three factors, the leverage ratio and short sale ratio,
respectively. The leverage ratio and short sale ratio alone can give an explanation of 86%,
larger than the FAMA three factor model.
β -0.41 (-5.88)*** -0.18 (-2.99)**
smb -0.40 (-6.91)*** -0.31 (-5.91)***
hml -0.079 (-1.65)* 0.038 (0.93)
leverage ratio -3.14 (-19.31)*** -2.91 (-18.00)***
short sale ratio 171.20 (5.00)*** 83.91 (2.46)**
const -0.15 (-3.10)*** -0.28 (-13.89)*** -0.054 (-1.26)
F-Statistics 1000 1731 976
R2 adjusted 0.825 0.860 0.874
# of samples 846 846 846
Note: One asterisk (*), two asterisks (**), and triple asterisks (***) denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% critical level, respectively.
are clearly a decreasing function of leverage ratio and increasing function of
short sale ratio. There are some quantitative difference between the actual
results and the numerical examples. For example, the minimum log-return
is about -0.8, much lower than the theoretic prediction. The log-return is
very sensitive to the short sale ratio. Even the variation of short sale is in
the order 10−3, it changes the log-return significantly. The purpose of this
study is to qualitatively understand the major cause of the market crash and
its implication for policy makers. Fitting perfectly to the actual data is not
the purpose of this study. Besides, there are many other factors that could
influence the observations. As mentioned in the model section, a deleveraging
shock conveys a negative signal to the market. s could decrease significantly,
which drags the price further deep.
We then use a linear regression analysis to see quantitatively how much
the log returns can be explained by the major factors considered in this
study, i.e., the leverage ratio and short sale ratio. The results are reported in
Table. 2. The first equation in the column 1 is the FAMA three factor model.
The coefficient of β is negative because the market return is negative during
the considered time period. The second column reports the results when
we regress the log-return with the leverage ratio and short sale ratio. As
expected, we have both statistically and economically significantly negative
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and positive contributions from the leverage ratio and the short sale ratio,
respectively. We can see that from the R2 the leverage ratio and short sale
ratio can explain the 86% of the variance of the data, higher than the FAMA
three factor model. When all variables are present in the regression, R2 only
increases marginally from 0.86 to 0.874. The sign of the leverage ratio and
short sale ratio are again as expected. By looking at the constant term of
the third column, which is the remainder (only -0.054 out of -0.59) of the
aggregate market return that is not explained by our model, we see that our
model can explain not only the cross sectional variation of the price return
up to 87%, but also the 91.5% (-0.54 out of -0.59) of the aggregate market
return.
4. Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we implement a theoretical model consisting of two rep-
resentative investors to investigate the problems of excessive leverage. We
offer a mechanism that excessive leverage could cause the crash of the market
if the short sales are constrained. There are two roles the short sellers can
play in stabilizing the market in a bullish environment where over-confident
investors take excessive leverage to invest. The short sellers provide extra
supply by short selling to temper the exuberant market so that the over-
confident investors would not push the market too high. During the delever-
aging process when the market swings back, the short sellers can catch the
falling price earlier to close their short positions. If the short sales are con-
strained, the short sellers are crowded out before the price is pushed too high
by the over-confident investors. It creates a liquidity vacuum in which short
sellers would not buy the reduced demand of over-confident investors untill
the price free fall to the level the short sellers are previously crowded out.
Excessive leverage is vicious but should not be blamed. There are no
effective ways to stop the loans if investors believe it is profitable to invest in
the risky asset by borrowing money from a cash market. It is equally hard to
prevent people from financing through other channels for stocks that are not
in the margin lending list. What could be done is to introduce a balancing
force from the short sellers so that the market can be settled at a fair price.
Short sales are blamed to cause the crash of the market. People forget
that it is the short sale constraints that push the price of the market to
the bubble territory in the first place. Our study shows that short sellers
can even help stabilize the market by absorbing the reduced demand by the
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debtors when they unwind their loans dealing a deleveraging shock. It is
important for the investors and especially the policy makers to understand
the roles short sellers can play in a health market. The short sales have been
practiced for more than 5 years in China. But the scale of short sales is
still very small, with a short interest on the order of 10−4 of total market
capitalization. But the short interest in the U.S. market have already reached
the level over 1.7% of total market capitalization as shown by 2001Davolio
(2002). Sources need to expand for investors to borrow stocks for short sales.
There are three index future contracts traded in the Chinese markets,
including two recently launched on April 16, 2015 before the crisis. The spot
markets are constrained in short selling. The future market offer investors
an alternative to short the market and a tool to manage their risk in a
downward-trending market. During the deleveraging crisis, the index future
contracts were traded at a maximum discount rate of over 10% with respect
to their spot indices. People may argue that the short sales on the future
market drag the spot market into the crisis. We believe it is more likely
that people turn to sell on the future markets when they can not close their
long position in stocks when they hit the 10% limit. In our study, the major
part of the aggregate market return (-0.54 out of -0.59) can be explained by
the 5 dependent variables (the FAMA three factors, the leverage ratio and
short sale ratio). It is left for the future study on the trading activities on
the future markets to find out whether the aggregate crash of the market is
further caused by the short sale on future markets or the crash of the future
markets are simply the mirror the crash of the spot market.
5. References
References
Bai, Y., Chang, E. C., Wang, J., 2007. Asset prices and short-sale constraints.
AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper.
Bris, A., Goetzmann, W. N., Zhu, N., 2007. Efficiency and the bear: Short
sales and markets around the world. The Journal of Finance 62 (3), 1029–
1079.
Chang, E. C., Cheng, J. W., Yu, Y., 2007. Short-sales constraints and price
discovery: Evidence from the hong kong market. The Journal of Finance
62 (5), 2097–2121.
17
Chang, E. C., Luo, Y., Ren, J., 2014. Short-selling, margin-trading, and
price efficiency: Evidence from the chinese market. Journal of Banking &
Finance 48, 411–424.
Davolio, G., 2002. The market for borrowing stock. Journal of financial eco-
nomics 66 (2), 271–306.
Eggertsson, G. B., Krugman, P., 2012. Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity
trap: A fisher-minsky-koo approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1469, 1513.
Fisher, I., 1933. The debt-deflation theory of great depressions. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 337–357.
Guerrieri, V., Lorenzoni, G., 2011. Credit crises, precautionary savings, and
the liquidity trap. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hall, R. E., 2011. The long slump. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Hong, H., Stein, J. C., 2003. Differences of opinion, short-sales constraints,
and market crashes. Review of financial studies 16 (2), 487–525.
Jones, C. M., Lamont, O. A., 2002. Short-sale constraints and stock returns.
Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2), 207–239.
Koo, R. C., 2011. The holy grail of macroeconomics: lessons from Japans
great recession. John Wiley & Sons.
Korinek, A., Simsek, A., 2014. Liquidity trap and excessive leverage. Tech.
rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mian, A. R., Sufi, A., 2012. What explains high unemployment? the aggre-
gate demand channel. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Miller, E. M., 1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. The Journal
of Finance 32 (4), 1151–1168.
Qiu, J., Zhang, Y., 2013. Effect of short-sale constraints on stock price ma-
nipulation. Pacific Economic Review 18 (2), 208–232.
18
Saffi, P. A., Sigurdsson, K., 2011. Price efficiency and short selling. Review
of Financial Studies, 821–852.
Xu, J., 2007. Price convexity and skewness. The Journal of Finance 62 (5),
2521–2552.
Zhao, Z., Li, S., Xiong, H., 2014. Short sale constraints, disperse pessimistic
beliefs and market efficiency evidence from the chinese stock market. Eco-
nomic Modelling 42, 333–342.
19
